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This paper studies the relationship between the business
cycle and ﬁnancial intermediation in the euro area. We estab-
lish stylized facts and study their stability during the global
ﬁnancial and the European sovereign debt crises. Long-term
interest rates have been exceptionally high, and long-term
loans and deposits exceptionally low, since the Lehman col-
lapse. Instead, short-term interest rates and short-term loans
and deposits did not show abnormal dynamics in the course of
the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crises.
JEL Codes: E32, E51, E52, C32, C51.
1. Introduction
In the autumn of 2008, the United States and the euro area were
in a recession (see, respectively, the results of the NBER and the
CEPR dating committees at www.nber.org and www.cepr.org). At
that stage, the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a banking cri-
sis and major disruptions in global ﬁnancial markets, which many
∗This paper builds on a framework that the authors developed for policy
analysis at the European Central Bank. We wish to thank the editor, Boragan
Aruoba, and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We also
thank Brandyn Bok, Antonello D’Agostino, Rujun Han, Marco Del Negro, Bjo¨rn
Fischer, Fabio Fornari, Jordi Gali, Romain Houssa, Alberto Musso, Huw Pill,
Giorgio Primiceri, and Julian Von Landesberger. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or
the Federal Reserve System.
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believe to have ampliﬁed the downturn leading to the deepest reces-
sion since the thirties. The euro area, after a brief and relatively weak
recovery, in 2011 plunged into a new recession and sovereign debt
crisis of some of its member states. During this period of prolonged
instability of the real economy and the ﬁnancial sector, the volume of
funds intermediated by the ﬁnancial sector sharply declined, accom-
panied by large ﬂuctuations in the associated interest rates. Do these
unprecedented developments reveal the emergence of anomalies in
the transmission mechanisms, in the nature of the shocks or in their
relative importance? Or do they just reﬂect unusually large but oth-
erwise standard business cycle shocks? Are potential anomalies con-
centrated only in some speciﬁc segments of ﬁnancial intermediation?
These are the main questions that we explore in this paper.
Our strategy to address these questions consists of two steps.
First, we establish stylized facts about the cyclical behavior of a
rich set of euro-area macroeconomic, monetary, and ﬁnancial vari-
ables before the prolonged period of turmoil starting in 2008. Then,
we explore whether the developments in the course of the recent
crises are characterized by a signiﬁcant break in the relation between
ﬁnancial intermediation and the rest of the economy.
We assess ﬁnancial intermediation by focusing on bank loans
and deposits. Although these variables describe only the activity of
banks, excluding market ﬁnancing, they capture a relevant part of
ﬁnancial intermediation because banks play a very relevant role in
the euro-area ﬁnancial system (European Central Bank 2008). Loans
and the corresponding lending rates are disaggregated by holding
sector—corporate and household mainly—and maturity. Monetary
aggregates include M1, M2, and M3. In addition, we distinguish
among all the categories of deposits which are part of M3, i.e.,
overnight deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits with matu-
rity up to two years. These categories exclude interbank deposits
as well as deposits with maturity longer than two years and they
represent approximately 30 percent of the liabilities of the banking
sector. Loans, on the asset side, account for a similar percentage. We
also abstract from international transactions (deposits and loans to
non-residents).
The empirical analysis is based on a ﬂexible linear dynamic
model, a large vector autoregressive (VAR) model, which allows us to
analyze simultaneously the dynamics of the variables in the data set.
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Inference is conducted using a Bayesian approach with informative
priors, to address the potentially severe problem of overﬁtting arising
from the large dimension of our model, as suggested in Doan, Litter-
man, and Sims (1984); Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2010); and
Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2015). The methodology provides
a framework for the analysis of the joint dynamics of a large panel
of time series without relying on the so-called marginal approach,
which consists of estimating a small system and then adding one
variable at a time (for examples of the latter modeling strategy, see
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1996; den Haan, Sumner, and
Yamashiro 2007). The latter approach has two drawbacks: it may
suﬀer from an omitted-variables problem, and it complicates the
interpretation of the results across models.
In order to establish stylized facts, we study the cyclical char-
acteristics of our variables in the pre-crisis period (January 1992
to September 2008). We perform this analysis by means of impulse
response functions to “cyclical” shocks, constructed as the linear
combination of shocks that explain the bulk of the cyclical variation
of variables describing real economic activity. This should not be
thought of as a structural identiﬁcation but, rather, as a statistical
device, which provides a summary description of contemporaneous,
leading and lagged correlations at business cycle frequencies over
the typical cycle. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the response to an adverse
cyclical shock reﬂects the narrative of typical recessions: economic
activity and prices decline, and so do interest rates, as monetary
policy becomes more accommodative.
We also compare the impulse responses to “cyclical” shocks with
the impulse responses of the system to an exogenous increase in the
short-term interest rate, i.e., a monetary policy shock. This compar-
ison provides additional insights on the relative importance of port-
folio and transaction eﬀects. Generally, the empirical results show
that the monetary policy shocks have contractionary eﬀects and,
hence, they imply a negative correlation between short-term inter-
est rates and economic activity. Instead, as mentioned above, in a
typical downturn this correlation is positive, due to the systematic
monetary policy reaction. This diﬀerence in conditional correlations
in typical and in policy-induced downturns allows us to qualitatively
assess the relative importance of real eﬀects and changes in the inter-
est rates for the ﬁnancial intermediation dynamics along the business
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cycle. Broadly speaking, the comparison of the responses to the two
shocks provides some information about the elasticities of diﬀerent
variables to economic activity and interest rates. Speciﬁcally, marked
diﬀerences of the responses of a speciﬁc aspect of ﬁnancial interme-
diation in the two diﬀerent types of contraction indicate that cyclical
shocks propagate primarily through interest rate eﬀects.
With the historical regularities at hand, we address the question
of whether the recent period of turmoil was characterized by a “sig-
niﬁcant break” in the dynamic interrelationships between ﬁnancial
intermediation and the rest of the economy. The analysis is carried
out by constructing counterfactual paths for loans, deposits, and
interest rates in the period ranging from October 2008 to February
2018. The counterfactual paths correspond to those we would have
observed, given (i) the pre-crisis historical regularities in the euro
area and (ii) the observed behavior of real economic activity and con-
sumer prices in the course of 2008–18. The pre-crisis historical regu-
larities are established using a sample that includes two recessions:
the one experienced in the early nineties and the early millennium
slowdown. Crucially, these are not episodes of major ﬁnancial disrup-
tion. Hence, relevant deviations of the estimated counterfactual path
from actual realizations reveal anomalies in the transmission mech-
anisms, in the nature of the shocks or in their relative importance,
speciﬁc to the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Our results reveal a dichotomy between short- and long-term
loans and deposits. While the developments in overnight deposits,
saving deposits, and corporate loans with maturity up to one year
appear to reﬂect historical regularities, the post-crisis dynamics in
deposits and loans (both to ﬁrms and households) at longer matu-
rity is characterized by a “signiﬁcant break.” In particular, already in
the early phases of the ﬁnancial crisis, loans to households have con-
tracted more than expected. The unusual decline of long-term loans
to ﬁrms is more pronounced during the sovereign crisis, reﬂecting
the process of ﬁnancial fragmentation emerging in euro-area coun-
tries. Interestingly, the observed path of the three-month EURIBOR
(an interbank interest rate, often considered as a proxy of the pol-
icy rate in empirical studies) is quite close to the median of the
distribution of its counterfactual path, i.e., the interbank market
rates have roughly behaved according to historical regularities with
respect to the business cycle in the euro area. This is due also to the
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non-standard monetary policy of the ECB, which has kept the spread
between interbank and policy rates under control during the crises.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies the euro-
area economy. However, to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper
studying business cycle properties of a broad set of variables rep-
resenting credit markets, monetary variables, and interest rates in
the euro area before and in the course of the prolonged period of
turmoil associated with the ﬁnancial and sovereign crises. Peers-
man (2013) also studies some aspects of ﬁnancial intermediation in
the euro area, with the aim of assessing the role of credit shocks
and without distinction of pre- and post-crisis developments. Other
papers have studied the monetary transmission mechanism in euro-
area data before the crisis. In particular, the ECB promoted a set of
studies providing many interesting results (see the collection of stud-
ies in Angeloni, Kashyap, and Mojon 2003). However, those studies
were based on a sample that included only a few years into the
existence of the monetary union, and none of the time-series stud-
ies considered our level of detailed information (in particular, see
the chapters by Peersman and Smets and Mojon and Peersman).
More recently, Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon (2009) have consid-
ered multi-country models, but the focus has not been on ﬁnancial
intermediation. On U.S. data, the papers by Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996), and den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007) are
close to the spirit of the ﬁrst part of our paper. In particular, these
authors used data on disaggregated loans and some components of
ﬂow-of-funds data in order to characterize the credit cycle and shed
some light on the “credit channel” of monetary policy. Our study,
however, has a broader scope. The analysis on deposits and the mon-
etary aggregates is of speciﬁc interest, given the importance that the
ECB attributes to these variables both as indicators of inﬂationary
pressures and of ﬁnancial risk (see, for example, Ferrero, Nobili, and
Passiglia 2007; Fischer et al. 2009; and Stark and Papademos 2010).1
Although our focus is mainly on the business cycle characteris-
tics of the euro-area variables, some of the results of the paper are
1The model developed in this paper is the basis of regular policy brieﬁng at
the European Central Bank and has been part of a project enhancing monetary
analysis in that institution.
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also related to the debate on the eﬀects of unconventional monetary
policy actions on the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
euro area (see, for example, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin 2010; Chen,
Curdia, and Ferrero 2011; Del Negro et al. 2011; Gambacorta, Hof-
mann, and Peersman 2011; Peersman 2011; Ciccarelli, Maddaloni,
and Peydro 2012; Giannone et al. 2012; and Kapetanios et al. 2012).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
database and the model speciﬁcation. Section 3 describes the styl-
ized facts on the functioning of the euro area in the pre-crisis period.
Section 4 analyzes the crisis. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Model Speciﬁcation
2.1 Data
The data set includes twenty-eight monthly macroeconomic, ﬁnan-
cial, monetary, and credit variables in the sample January 1992 to
February 2018. We also include selected variables for the United
States, in order to capture international linkages. The appendix
provides precise variables deﬁnitions.
The macroeconomic block includes measures of real activity
(industrial production and the unemployment rate) and prices for
the euro area. We also include U.S. industrial production and con-
sumer prices. The three-month EURIBOR and the U.S. federal funds
rates are our proxies for the policy rate in the euro area and the
United States, respectively. The rest of the ﬁnancial block includes
interest rates on government bonds at diﬀerent maturities, euro-area
stock prices, and the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate.
Turning to ﬁnancial intermediation, our focus in this paper is on
bank deposits and loans, which represent an important component
of ﬁnancial intermediation and can be particularly informative about
the role of the ﬁnancial sector in the transmission of shocks. For this
reason, we include rich monetary and credit blocks in our database.
Regarding the monetary block, the database includes the three main
euro-area monetary aggregates, time deposits and saving deposits.
The narrowest aggregate, M1, is the sum of currency in circula-
tion and overnight deposits. M2 consists of M1 plus time deposits
(i.e., deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years) and sav-
ing deposits (i.e., deposits redeemable with a notice of up to three
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months), which we also include individually in the database. Finally,
M3 consists of M2 plus repurchase agreements (repos), money mar-
ket funds shares, and debt securities issued with a maturity of up
to two years. Loans to the private sector are decomposed into those
to non-ﬁnancial corporations and those to households. Moreover, we
distinguish between loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations with matu-
rity up to one year (short term) and above one year (long term).
Loans to households, instead, are further decomposed according to
their purpose: consumer loans, mortgages, and other loans. We also
include the lending rates for diﬀerent types of loans whenever avail-
able, i.e., for short-term loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations, loans
for house purchases, and consumer loans.2
2.2 The Model
Let Xt be a vector including the n variables just described (all vari-
ables enter the empirical model in terms of log-levels, except for
variables expressed in rates or with negative levels, which enter in
levels). We estimate a VAR model with p (=7) lags:
Xt = A0 + A1Xt−1 + A2Xt−2 · · · + ApXt−p + t,
where t is a normally distributed multivariate white noise with
covariance matrix Σ.
The large dimension (n = 28 and p = 7) of our VAR model
implies that we face an issue of over-ﬁtting, due to the large number
of parameters (the so-called curse of dimensionality). We address
this issue by shrinking the parameters toward those of the na¨ıve and
parsimonious random walk with drift model, Xi,t = δi+Xi,t−1+ei,t.
De Mol, Giannone, and Reichlin (2008) and Banbura, Giannone, and
Reichlin (2010) have shown that this approach reduces estimation
uncertainty without introducing substantial bias. This is achieved
thanks to the tendency for macroeconomic time series to co-move
over the business cycle, which creates scope for the data to point
“massively” in the same direction against a na¨ıve prior model that
does not allow for any dynamic interaction. The resulting model
2We thank Christoﬀer Kok Sorensen for sharing with us the data on the
lending rates used in Kok Sorensen and Werner (2006).
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oﬀers a parsimonious but reliable estimate of the complex dynamic
interactions among the macro, monetary, and ﬁnancial variables in
the data set.
More speciﬁcally, we use a normal-inverse-Wishart prior cen-
tered on a random-walk model. For Σ, the covariance matrix of the
residuals, we use an inverse-Wishart prior distribution with scale
parameter given by a diagonal matrix Ψ and d = n + 2 degrees of
freedom. This is the minimum number of degrees of freedom that
guarantees the existence of the prior mean of Σ, which is equal to
Ψ/(d − n − 1) = Ψ.
For the constant A0 term, we use a ﬂat prior. For the autore-
gressive coeﬃcients (A1 . . . Ap), we use the Minnesota prior and two
priors on the sum of coeﬃcients, as originally proposed by Litterman
(1979), Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984), and Sims (1996).
As regards the Minnesota prior, conditional on the covariance
matrix of the residuals, the prior distribution of the autoregressive
coeﬃcients is normal with the following means and variances:
E(A1) = In while E(A2) = · · · = E(Ap) = 0n,n,
where Cov [(As)i,j , (Ar)h,m | Σ] = ( λ
2Σi,h
s2 Ψj,j
) if m = j and r = s, zero
otherwise.
Notice that the variance of these prior distributions decays with
the lag, and that coeﬃcients associated with the same variables and
lags in diﬀerent equations are allowed to be correlated. The key
hyperparameter is λ, which controls the scale of all the prior vari-
ances and covariances, and eﬀectively determines the overall tight-
ness of this prior. For λ = 0, the posterior equals the prior and the
data do not inﬂuence the estimates. If λ → ∞, on the other hand,
the posterior expectations coincide with the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates. The factor 1/s2 is the rate at which the prior vari-
ance decreases with increasing lag length, and Σi,hΨj,j accounts for the
diﬀerent scale and variability of the data.
The two priors on the sum of the VAR coeﬃcients were intro-
duced as reﬁnements of the Minnesota prior to further “favor unit
roots and cointegration, which ﬁts the beliefs reﬂected in the prac-
tices of many applied macroeconomists” (see Sims and Zha 1998,
p. 958). These additional priors tend to reduce the importance of
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the deterministic component implied by VARs estimated condition-
ing on the initial observations (see Sims 1996; Giannone, Lenza,
and Primiceri 2019). The ﬁrst of these two priors is known as the
no-cointegration (or, simply, sum-of-coeﬃcients) prior. To under-
stand what this prior entails, we rewrite the VAR equation in an
error-correction form:
ΔXt = A0 + (A1 + · · · + Ap − IN )Xt−p
+ B1ΔXt−1 + · · · + BpΔXt−p + t,
where Bs = −As+1 − · · · − Ap.
A VAR in ﬁrst diﬀerences implies the restriction Π = (A1+ · · ·+
Ap − IN ) = 0. Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984) introduced the
no-cointegration prior which centered at 1 the sum of coeﬃcients on
own lags for each variable, and at 0 for the sum of coeﬃcients on
other variables’ lags. This prior also introduces correlation among
the coeﬃcients on each variable in each equation. The tightness of
this additional prior is controlled by the hyperparameter μ. As μ
goes to inﬁnity, the prior becomes diﬀuse while, as it goes to 0, it
implies the presence of a unit root in each equation.
Notice that, in the limit, the prior just discussed is not consis-
tent with cointegration. This motivates the use of an additional prior
on the sum of coeﬃcients that was introduced by Sims (1996) and
is known as the dummy-initial-observation prior. This prior states
that a no-change forecast for all variables is a good forecast at the
beginning of the sample. The hyperparameter δ controls the tight-
ness of this prior. As δ tends to 0, the prior becomes more dog-
matic and all the variables of the VAR are forced to be at their
unconditional mean, or the system is characterized by the presence
of an unspeciﬁed number of unit roots without drift. As such, the
dummy-initial-observation prior is consistent with cointegration.
The setting of these priors depends on the hyperparameters λ,
μ, δ, and Ψ, which reﬂect the informativeness of the prior distri-
bution for the model’s coeﬃcients. These parameters are usually
set on the basis of subjective considerations or rules of thumb. We
follow a more formal approach proposed by Giannone, Lenza, and
Primiceri (2015). This involves treating the coeﬃcients of the prior
as additional parameters, in the spirit of hierarchical modeling. As
hyperpriors (i.e., prior distributions for the hyperparameters), we
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use proper but almost ﬂat distributions. In this setup, the marginal
likelihood evaluated at the posterior mode of the hyperparameters is
close to its maximum. Given the draws of the hyperparameters, the
VAR coeﬃcients can then be drawn from their posterior distribution,
which is normal/inverse Wishart.
2.3 Empirical Exercises
The VAR model is used to establish stylized facts for the period
prior to the last crisis and, then, to identify anomalies during the
crisis. The pre-crisis sample is January 1992–September 2008.
2.3.1 Pre-crisis Stylized Facts
The main tools to describe the business cycle features of key mon-
etary and credit aggregates are their impulse response functions to
a “cyclical shock,” i.e., the shock that accounts for the bulk of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations. The cyclical (or, alternatively, business cycle)
shock is deﬁned as the linear combination of orthogonal shocks that
captures the maximum variance of industrial production at business
cycle frequencies (i.e., those related to cycles with a period of length
between two and eight years).3 More in detail, our VAR(p) model
can be rewritten as
Xt − A0 − A1Xt−1 − A2Xt−2 − · · · − ApXt−p = εt εt ∼ WN(0,Σ)
and, using ﬁlter notation,
A(L)Xt = A0 + εt εt ∼ WN(0,Σ).
The spectral density matrix associated with the model can be
deﬁned as
S(ω) = A
(
e−iω
)−1
Σ
(
eiω
)−1′
,
where A(z) = In − A1z − A2z2 − · · · − Apzp for all complex num-
bers z. Notice that since the variables are in (log)-levels, the spectral
3This identiﬁcation strategy has also been used by Di Cecio and Owyang
(2010) and more recently by Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018). Uhlig (2004)
and Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala (2005) adopt similar identiﬁcation strategies
in the time domain.
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density matrix may not be well deﬁned for ω = 0. For this reason,
S(ω) is often deﬁned as the pseudo-spectrum. Deﬁne the structural
VAR as
Xt − A0 − A1Xt−1 − A2Xt−2 − ... − ApXt−p = Cut,
ut ∼ WN(0, In),
where C = Σ1/2R′, Σ1/2 is any version of the square root of Σ (for
example, the Cholesky) and R is a rotation matrix (i.e., R′R = I)
to be chosen on the basis of the identifying assumptions. Finally,
ut = RΣ−1/2εt are the structural shocks. Notice that, given the
properties of the rotation matrix R, the structural shocks are orthog-
onal to each other. The conditional spectral density associated with
the j-th structural shock is given by
Sj(ω) = A
(
e−iω
)−1
Σ1/2rjr′jΣ
1/2A
(
eiω
)−1′
,
where rj is the j -th column of R, i.e., r′jrj = 1 for all j while r
′
jri = 0
for all i = j. The orthogonality of structural shocks implies
S(ω) =
n∑
j=1
Sj(ω).
The cyclical shock (say, the m-th shock) is deﬁned as the shock
um,t = r′mΣ
−1/2εt that explains the maximum of the variance of
unemployment (say, the k-th variable) at the business cycle frequen-
cies ω ∈ [−ω, ω]. The spectral density of variable k conditional on
shock m corresponds to the k-th diagonal element of Sj(ω) and,
hence, the variance at business cycle frequencies V bck,m of variable k
conditional on shock m can be computed as
V bck,m =
[
2
∫ ω
ω
Sj(ω)dω
]
k,k
.
As a consequence, our objective is
r∗m = arg max
r:r′r=1
[∫ ω
ω
A
(
e−iω
)−1
Σ1/2rr′Σ1/2A
(
e−iω
)−1′
dω
]
k,k
.
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In the objective function, in order to focus on conventional busi-
ness cycle frequencies, we set ω = 2π32 (frequency of thirty-two quar-
ters, i.e., eight years) and ω = 2π8 (frequency of eight quarters, i.e.,
two years). In practice, we perform the maximization for all draws
from the posterior of the VAR coeﬃcients A0, A1, . . . , Ap and the
residuals covariance matrix Σ.
Notice that this is not an economic identiﬁcation but rather a
statistical identiﬁcation that we use as a device to study dynamic
correlations over the business cycles. The impulse response func-
tions to this shock should reﬂect the unconditional correlations over
the “typical” business cycle. In other words, this “statistical iden-
tiﬁcation” approach allows us to extract information on the cross-
correlations of the series of interest at business cycle frequencies,
also preserving information on lead-lag relations.
We also study the impulse responses of the system to an exoge-
nous increase in the short-term interest rate, i.e., a monetary policy
shock. Generally, as the empirical results will show, these shocks have
contractionary eﬀects and, hence, they imply a negative correlation
between short-term interest rates and economic activity. Instead, in a
“typical downturn” this correlation is positive, due to the systematic
monetary policy reaction. This diﬀerence in conditional correlations
in “typical” and in policy-induced downturns allows us to qualita-
tively assess the relative importance of real eﬀects and changes in
the interest rates for the ﬁnancial intermediation dynamics along the
business cycle. Broadly speaking, the comparison of the responses
to the two shocks provides some information about the elasticities
of diﬀerent variables to economic activity and interest rates. Indeed,
marked diﬀerences of the responses of a speciﬁc aspect of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation in the two diﬀerent types of contraction indicate
that cyclical shocks propagate primarily through interest rate eﬀects.
This should not be confused with the importance of the shocks,
which is instead assessed using the variance decomposition.4
4It is important to notice that this method provides only a qualitative inspec-
tion of transmission mechanisms. A fully ﬂedged analysis, able to precisely disen-
tangle all the diﬀerent features of the shock propagation, can only be conducted
with more structural models such as, for example, dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. However, the advantage of our modeling strategy is that it
provides an empirically robust characterization of the dynamics of a large and
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For the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shocks, we rely on
two alternative strategies, both considering the three-month EURI-
BOR as a good proxy for the policy rate, before the crises.5 Our ﬁrst
strategy is based on a recursive scheme (see Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans 1999 for a discussion of this identiﬁcation scheme) which
implies that the indicators of euro-area economic activity and prices
and the U.S. variables (these are the seven variables ordered above
the EURIBOR in the VAR and in table 1 in the appendix) can
react to the monetary policy shock only after one month. Finan-
cial variables, instead (these are the variables ordered under the
EURIBOR in the VAR and in table 1 in the appendix), can react
instantaneously to the monetary policy shock. Our second identiﬁca-
tion scheme is based on sign restrictions (Uhlig 2005; Arias, Rubio-
Ramirez, and Waggoner 2014). The sign restrictions are imposed for
three months and assume a negative correlation of the EURIBOR
with M1, industrial production, and the harmonized index of con-
sumer prices and a positive correlation of the EURIBOR with the
unemployment rate, bond rates, and lending rates. We ﬁnd that the
choice of the identiﬁcation scheme is immaterial for the purpose of
interpreting the dynamics ensuing to cyclical shocks (although some
diﬀerences emerge in the impulse responses to the monetary pol-
icy shocks themselves) and we consider the recursive scheme as our
baseline in the rest of the paper.6
2.3.2 The Crisis
After having established the pre-crisis facts, we ask whether the
prolonged period of crisis has induced changes in the structure of
detailed set of monetary and credit variables, among others, which would still be
diﬃcult to achieve for the current generation of structural models.
5The EONIA (overnight interbank rate) may be a better proxy for the policy
rate, in principle. We have used the three-month EURIBOR, since the EONIA is
available only on a shorter sample than ours. However, results are robust to this
choice, since the parameters are estimated before the crisis when the EURIBOR
and the EONIA were almost perfectly collinear. The analysis of the stability in the
aftermath of the crisis is also not aﬀected, since, as discussed in the next section,
our counterfactual paths are constructed by conditioning only on business cycle
developments and not on interest rates.
6Figure A1 in the online appendix (available at http://www.ijcb.org) shows
both sets of impulse responses to a monetary shock.
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correlations among the variables in our system. To this end, we com-
pare the observed developments in monetary and credit markets with
those implied by the pre-crisis correlations and the observed devel-
opments in the real economy and in consumer prices. To assess the
latter, we perform a counterfactual scenario analysis for the period
ranging from October 2008 until February 2018. The counterfactuals
are constructed as follows:
(i) We use the same coeﬃcients estimated in the previous section,
i.e., using the sample January 1992–September 2008.
(ii) We assume that the euro-area industrial production, the euro-
area unemployment rate, the U.S. industrial production, and
consumer prices in the euro area and in the United States are
known for the whole sample, while all other variables are only
observed until September 2008.
(iii) We compute the conditional expectations for all variables and
for the period October 2008–February 2018 based on the pre-
crisis VAR coeﬃcients (see step (i)) and the knowledge of
euro-area and U.S. real activity developments and consumer
prices in the whole sample (see step (ii)).7
Notice that the coeﬃcients of the model are kept ﬁxed at the
pre-crisis value. Therefore, our conditional forecasts capture the
most likely shocks that could generate the Great Recession under
the assumption of no change in the average features of the shocks
(because the covariance matrix of the forecast errors is kept ﬁxed)
and in the dynamic interdependence among the variables (because
the autoregressive coeﬃcients are kept ﬁxed), compared with the
pre-crisis period. Hence, we would identify a large diﬀerence between
observed and counterfactual dynamics only if the crisis had induced
substantial structural changes or it had been generated by shocks of
unprecedented nature.
7The conditional expectations are computed by means of the simulation
smoother described in Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015) and based on Carter
and Kohn (1994) and Durbin and Koopman (2001).
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From a methodological point of view, this paper relates to the
literature on time variation in macroﬁnancial linkages. Some of this
literature (see, for example, Prieto, Eickmeier, and Marcellino 2016)
takes the route of estimating VAR models with continuous changes
in shock volatilities, autoregressive dynamics, and contemporary
relationships among variables, as developed and reﬁned in Primiceri
(2005) and Del Negro and Primiceri (2015). Other papers (see, for
example, Nason and Tallman 2015) assume instead that the varia-
tion evolves in a Markov-switching fashion. One advantage of the two
approaches above would be to make breakpoints endogenous, rather
than imposing them on speciﬁc dates. We rely on the methodology
based on a time-invariant VAR and counterfactuals on the crisis
period for two main reasons. First, a potential disadvantage of the
time-varying approaches above is that they can aggravate the curse
of dimensionality, in particular given our purpose to gauge the stabil-
ity of the relationships of relatively rich monetary and credit blocks
with the rest of the economy. Moreover, the focus of this paper is
not to identify breaks over the euro-area sample; rather, we ask pre-
cisely whether the recent ﬁnancial and sovereign crises disrupted
the macroﬁnancial linkages in the euro area. An alternative to the
BVAR model for high-dimensional systems is the dynamic factor
model (DFM). DFMs and large VARs are intimately related: they
are not competing models but, rather, complementary approaches to
econometrics with big data. Speciﬁcally, recent theoretical analysis
and empirical evidence shows that Bayesian shrinkage and dynamic
factor models produce similar results in terms of (i) structural iden-
tiﬁcation of shocks, (ii) unconditional forecasts, and (iii) conditional
forecasting (see De Mol, Giannone, and Reichlin 2008; Banbura,
Giannone, and Reichlin 2010; and Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza
2015). We use the BVAR methodology since it allows us to take
into account the uncertainty associated with all the modeling deci-
sions, from the degree of shrinkage to the degree of “diﬀerencing”
(see Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri 2015). In the dynamic factor
model, instead, the decision on the number of factors and the dif-
ferencing of the data is based on pre-testing, and the uncertainty
associated with these choices is not easy to account for. Stock and
Watson (2012) use a DFM to investigate the stability of the cyclical
characteristics of many U.S. variables during the ﬁnancial crisis in a
similar vein to our study.
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3. Results
3.1 Stylized Facts Before the Crisis: 1992–2008
In this section, we analyze the historical correlations between ﬁnan-
cial intermediation and business cycle developments over the period
from January 1992 to September 2008.
Figure 1 reports the median (dashed line) and the 16 percent and
84 percent quantiles of the distribution (shaded area) of the impulse
responses to a one-standard-deviation cyclical shock.8 The results
are cast in terms of the log-levels of the variables (or of the levels
for the variables expressed in rates) over a horizon of up to twenty-
four months after the shocks. We also report the median impulse
response to a monetary policy shock (dotted line).9
We ﬁnd that the results on the cyclical shock reﬂect the narra-
tive of typical recessions: industrial production declines and so do
consumer conﬁdence, production prices, and stock prices. Unemploy-
ment is anticyclical and HICP declines with a delay. The euro/dollar
exchange rate is quite unresponsive. Perhaps surprisingly, the eﬀects
of monetary policy shocks in the euro area are similar, at least in
qualitative terms, to those found for the United States. In particu-
lar, in response to a monetary contraction, we estimate a protracted
decline in real activity associated with a similar development in con-
sumer conﬁdence, an appreciation of the euro with respect to the dol-
lar, and a decline in stock prices. We also ﬁnd that consumer prices
(HICP) hardly move, although the median response shows evidence
of a price puzzle (for early ﬁndings on some of these features, see
Peersman and Smets 2003).
We now turn to the responses of interest rates, loans, and
deposits, on which we focus in the analysis of the crisis period in
8A one-standard-deviation cyclical shock decreases industrial production, on
impact, by 1.2 percent, with a trough at −1.6 percent over the horizon in which
we estimate the impulse response functions. For the sake of readability, we report
only the result for the main twenty variables. The full set of results is available
upon request.
9For comparability, we rescale the impulse response to a monetary policy shock
to match the peak impact of the cyclical shock on unemployment. The full set of
unscaled impulse responses to a monetary policy shock is available in the online
appendix, together with a robustness check in which we identify the eﬀects of the
monetary policy shock by means of sign restrictions.
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the next section. In response to a cyclical contraction, we observe
a negative and slightly lagged response of the short-term interest
rate (three-month EURIBOR), reﬂecting the systematic response of
monetary policy. On the contrary, when the decline in industrial
production is generated by an exogenous monetary tightening, we
observe an increase in the short-term rates. In response to a cyclical
contraction, the decline of long-term interest rates (government bond
returns with maturities from two to ten years) is of similar magni-
tude as the decline in short-term interest rates and the shape of the
yield curve is unaﬀected while, in a monetary tightening, long-term
rates move in the same direction as the policy rate, but considerably
less. Hence, in the aftermath of a monetary tightening, the spread
between long and short rates declines, while it is unaﬀected in a cycli-
cal contraction. These diﬀerent responses of short-term interest rates
and the term spread in the two diﬀerent types of contraction, cyclical
and monetary, can help to interpret our results on the cyclical fea-
tures of the variables. If the dynamics of a given variable are mainly
driven by real economic developments, then we should expect it to
behave similarly in the cyclical and the monetary contractions, which
are both characterized by a decline in economic activity. Conversely,
if interest rate eﬀects are prominent in explaining the dynamics of
such variables, we should expect marked diﬀerences in the response
to the two shocks.10
The narrow monetary aggregate, M1 (which includes currency
and overnight deposits) increases in the course of a cyclical contrac-
tion, i.e., it shows an anticyclical behavior. Instead, it decreases in
response to a monetary tightening (the so-called liquidity eﬀect),
suggesting that interest rate eﬀects dominate the eﬀects from eco-
nomic activity in determining its behavior. In fact, M1 is negatively
correlated with the policy rate, conditionally on both shocks. Hence,
narrow money is mainly driven by liquidity eﬀects. These results
explain the negative unconditional correlation between the growth
rate of M1 and industrial production (see ﬁgure 2, panel A). When
economic activity weakens, the short-term interest rate responds
negatively, with a lag. Contemporaneously to the drop in short-
term interest rates, M1 increases due to the liquidity eﬀect, which
10For a similar analysis on U.S. data, using a diﬀerent technical approach, see
den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007).
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explains the negative unconditional correlation between economic
activity and M1 growth.
As for M1, the response of M2−M1 and M3−M1 to a cycli-
cal contraction is diﬀerent from the response to a monetary con-
traction.11 This suggests that the changes in economic activity are
not the predominant force also to account for the developments
in broader monetary aggregates. However, the cyclical behavior of
M2−M1 and M3−M1 is the opposite of that of M1: the response
in a cyclical contraction is negative while it is positive in a monetary
contraction. Moreover, the correlation with the interest rate is always
positive, independently from the nature of the shock. These results
suggest that portfolio considerations are important drivers of broad
money. In fact, in a monetary tightening, the positive spread open-
ing up between short-term rates and long-term bond rates implies
that short-term monetary assets (especially time deposits) earn a
higher return than non-monetary assets with longer maturity (e.g.,
government bonds), boosting M2−M1 and M3−M1. Instead, in
response to a cyclical contraction, the shape of the yield curve is not
aﬀected.
The implication of these ﬁndings is that, while M1 is counter-
cyclical, M3 and M2 are not very correlated with the cycle and they
are inversely related to the term spread (see ﬁgure 2, panel B). To
further interpret these ﬁndings, we now look at saving and time
deposits.12
M3−M1 and M2−M1 appear to mainly reﬂect the dynamics
of time deposits. In fact, as M3−M1 and M2−M1, time deposits
are positively correlated with the short-term interest rates. Saving
deposits, instead, are mainly driven by the liquidity eﬀect. Indeed,
saving deposits have shorter maturity than time deposits and, hence,
behave very similarly to the overnight deposits in M1. Instead,
the decision of holding time deposits, which have longer maturi-
ties than saving deposits, is dominated by portfolio considerations:
11M2−M1 is of about the same magnitude of M1 and accounts for between 40
and 48 percent of the whole M3 while the M3−M2 component is smaller, i.e.,
between 11 and 15 percent of M3.
12Saving deposits and time deposits have more or less equal share in M2−M1
and saving deposits are more liquid.
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higher short-term rates imply higher returns for time deposits which,
everything else equal, should induce substitution from other, non-
monetary, asset holdings.
Loans are generally procyclical. However, short-term corporate
loans show a delayed response. This explains why loans to non-
ﬁnancial corporations lag the business cycle (see ﬁgure 2, panel C).
This result has important implications for the debate on banking
regulation. Some of the leading proposals on ﬁnancial reforms sug-
gesting to use quantities based on loans as early warning for ﬁnan-
cial stability risks are likely to be ineﬀective, since loans provide
a delayed signal for those risks (for a discussion on these issues,
see Repullo and Saurina 2011). Loans respond more to real vari-
ables than to lending rates: they are procyclical whether or not
the rates decline (non-monetary contraction) or increase (monetary
contraction). However, there is a signiﬁcant exception: short-term
loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations, on impact, react positively to
a monetary contraction, indicating that interest rate eﬀects dom-
inate in the short run. This feature has also been found in U.S.
data by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and more recently by den
Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007). One possible interpretation
of this ﬁnding, in line with the discussion in den Haan, Sumner,
and Yamashiro (2007), is that an increase in interest rates induces
banks to rebalance their loans portfolio in favor of more proﬁtable
and less risky short-term corporate loans, reducing the stock of loans
to households. Another explanation for this ﬁnding is that, facing
the upward pressure on their cost of lending induced by a mone-
tary tightening, ﬁrms may be encouraged to draw down their pre-
committed credit lines with banks. Finally, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993) argue that the demand of loans may increase in an economic
recession due to the need of ﬁrms to address the squeeze in their cash
ﬂows.
The comparison between a monetary and a cyclical contraction
sheds light on the relative merits of the three interpretations. If the
temporary increase in loans were due to demand eﬀects (as advo-
cated by Gertler and Gilchrist 1993) with a negligible role for interest
rate eﬀects, we would expect it to materialize also in the case of a
cyclical contraction, which is contrary to our ﬁndings.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the responses of lending rates in both
types of contractions bear some similarity to those of the short-term
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Figure 3. Variance Decomposition
Notes: Median share of variance explained by the monetary policy shock, large
dots; median share of variance explained by the cyclical shock, small dots; 16th
and 84th quantiles of the distribution of the share of variance explained by the
cyclical shock, solid lines. Horizontal axis: variables. Vertical axis: percentage of
variance explained.
interest rates, but they are stickier, in particular those for consumer
loans.13
Figure 3 reports the percentage of the variance at business cycle
frequencies accounted for by the cyclical shocks. In particular, we
report the median (small dots) and the 16th and 84th quantiles
(lines) of the distribution of the share of variance accounted for by
the cyclical shock. As a comparison, we also report the median of the
distribution of the share of variance accounted for by the monetary
policy shock (large dots).
The cyclical shock explains, on average across variables, about
25 percent of the variance at business cycle frequencies. Among cat-
egories of loans, short-term loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations and
13For a survey of studies on the stickiness of lending rates, see Kok Sorensen
and Werner (2006).
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mortgages are the most cyclical variables. Among monetary aggre-
gates, the share of the variance of M1 explained by the cyclical shock
is slightly more than 20 percent, while it is considerably lower for
broader monetary aggregates.
The monetary policy shock does not appear to be an important
driver of business cycle ﬂuctuations. On average, it explains less than
5 percent of the variance at business cycle frequencies and it accounts
for about 10 percent only for the short-term interest rate and lend-
ing rates. This result might also be due to the speciﬁc sample on
which we estimate our model (1992–2008).14
4. The Financial and Sovereign Crises in the Euro Area
Do the relationships we established in the previous section remain
robust once we control for the unprecedented size of the shocks expe-
rienced over the course of the crises? For the analysis over the period
of the ﬁnancial and sovereign crises, we focus on loans, deposits, and
interest rates.15
In practice, we compute conditional expectations of the vari-
ables of interest on the basis of historical (pre-crisis, the VAR model
is estimated with data until September 2008) correlations and the
realized path of variables representing business cycle conditions and
consumer prices.16 By conditioning on macroeconomic variables, we
capture the size of the shocks that would have caused the recent
recessions if they were due to the sources of ﬂuctuations that have
typically generated recessions in the euro area. For example, if exoge-
nous ﬁnancial shocks were traditionally associated with a recession
in the euro area, we would be implicitly conditioning also on those
shocks.
To assess whether the variables of interest developed according
to historical regularities, we compare their conditional expectations
14For example, Mojon (2008) shows that, for the United States, “unsystematic
monetary policy” played a very small role in the sample 1985 to 2008, while it
was much more prominent in earlier samples.
15The complete set of results is available upon request.
16See Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) for an application of this idea to
identify the eﬀects of the inception of the euro on per capita GDP in the euro-area
countries.
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Figure 4. Actual and Counterfactual Year-on-Year
Growth Rates of M3 and Components
Note: Solid line: actual year-on-year growth rates; shaded areas: counterfactual
distribution, 16th to 84th quantile range.
with the actual developments from October 2008 onward. Signiﬁ-
cant discrepancies would signal either the materialization of diﬀerent
shocks from those traditionally prevailing to explain the dynamics
of the variables of interest, or a change in the relationship between
the latter variables and the conditioning set during the crisis.
Figure 4 reports the actual and counterfactual decomposition of
the year-on-year growth rate of M1, savings deposits, time deposits,
M3−M2, and M3.
The counterfactual on monetary aggregates shows no particu-
larly exceptional behavior of M1, implying that overnight deposits,
an important component of banks’ retail funding, have been rela-
tively resilient during the last two crises. M3, instead, has strongly
declined during the crises, and its evolution is much more diﬃcult
to reconcile with the historical regularities captured in our empiri-
cal model. Only recently, starting in 2015, the M3 growth rates are
again in line with historical regularities. The analysis by components
indicates that the collapse in M3 growth is mainly explained by the
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Figure 5. Actual and Counterfactual Year-on-Year
Growth Rates of Retail Loans
Note: Solid line: actual year-on-year growth rates; shaded areas: counterfac-
tual distribution, 16th to 84th quantile range. NFC stands for non-ﬁnancial
corporations.
less liquid time deposits and M3−M2 components, while the saving
deposits, which have a shorter maturity than time deposits, move
more in line with M1.
Figure 5 reports the actual and counterfactual paths of the year-
on-year growth rates of short- and long-term loans to non-ﬁnancial
corporations, consumer loans, and mortgages.
Short-term loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations evolved in line
with past regularities, except maybe in the very recent part of
the sample. Long-term loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations, con-
sumer loans, and mortgages, on the other hand, show an exceptional
decline. As for the monetary aggregates, it is the long-term segment
of loans which is particularly weak during the crisis period.17
17In ﬁgure A2 (in the online appendix), we show that the exceptional weakness
of loans to households—i.e., consumer loans and loans for house purchases in
the aftermath of the Lehman collapse—can be rationalized by conditioning on
the post-crisis developments of house prices and the euro-area budget-to-GDP
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Figure 6. Counterfactual Exercises on Three-Month
EURIBOR
Note: Solid line: three-month EURIBOR; shaded area: 16th to 84th quantile
of the distribution of the conditional forecasts of the EURIBOR; dashed line:
EONIA rate.
Figure 6 reports the observed path of the three-month EURI-
BOR and the distribution of its counterfactual path (median and
16th and 84th quantiles). We also include the path of the EONIA
rate, for reference.
The counterfactual path for the EURIBOR reﬂects the stance
of monetary policy that would materialize had the ECB conducted
its standard monetary policy according to the regularities observed
before the crisis. Since no constraint is imposed on the counterfactual
path, nothing prevents it from crossing the zero line and stepping
ratio. The latter variables are available at the quarterly frequency and were inter-
polated to be included in our monthly VAR. We also ﬁnd that the inclusion of
house prices and the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio do not change the pre-crisis results.
Hence, we can conclude that the weakness in household loans during the Great
Recession is at least partly due to the speciﬁc ﬁnancial shocks reﬂected in the
two additional conditioning variables. However, in the episode of the sovereign
debt crisis, such weakness emerges again, and it cannot be rationalized by the
inclusion of house prices and the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio. The source for the data
on the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is Paredes, Pedregal, and Perez (2009).
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into negative territory. In practice, our counterfactual EURIBOR
path can be interpreted as a sort of shadow rate, capturing the
stance of monetary policy “according” to historical regularities.
Interestingly, the observed path of the three-month EURIBOR
is, over the full horizon under analysis, well inside the 16th and
84th quantiles of the counterfactual forecast distribution, i.e., the
interbank market rates have roughly behaved according to historical
regularities with respect to the business cycle in the euro area.18
Moreover, in the course of the last decade, the probability that
the counterfactual interest rate remains positive was always quite
high. In this probabilistic sense, the zero lower bound was not too
strongly binding in the euro area. This contrasts with the U.S.
case for which Stock and Watson (2012), on the basis of a similar
approach, ﬁnd that the zero lower bound was binding very early into
the crisis period. This diﬀerent assessment of the two areas, partic-
ularly for the period of the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09, is also
conﬁrmed by back-of-the-envelope calculations based on a simple
Taylor rule, since during that episode the increase in unemployment
rates was larger in the United States than in the euro area.19
In the ﬁgure, we also report the EONIA rate, which is a bet-
ter proxy of the policy rate for the euro area. The EONIA and the
three-month EURIBOR were almost undistinguishable before the
long period of crisis facing the euro area. The spread between the
two rates became more sizable in the ﬁrst phase of the crisis, but
it was still quite limited relative to the uncertainty surrounding our
counterfactuals and, after 2012, it markedly decreased, reaching its
historical lows. The latter dynamics are also due to the non-standard
monetary policy of the ECB which, providing ample liquidity to the
18Stock and Watson (2012) ﬁnd a breakdown of the relationship of the U.S.
federal funds rate. We ﬁnd that our result on the EURIBOR remains robust also
if we condition on the post-crisis developments in the U.S. federal funds rate. The
results are available upon request. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting
this additional exercise.
19According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the unemployment gap in that period was 1 percent in the euro area
and 4 percent in the United States. Based on these estimates, Nechio (2011) found
that a simple Taylor rule based on the euro area is able to accurately predict the
observed behavior of the short-term interest rate.
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monetary and ﬁnancial institutions in the euro area, contributed to
stabilize the money market rates.
In ﬁgure 7, we report the ten-year bond rates and the associated
spread with respect to the three-month EURIBOR.
Uncertainty around bond rates is quite large. However, relative to
short-term rates, it emerges that long-term rates have been less reac-
tive to cyclical conditions than what has been historically observed.
The stickiness of long-term rates has also been observed in other
countries and periods (for the United States, for example, see Backus
and Wright 2007). Combined with the sharp decline in short-term
rates during the ﬁrst phase of the crisis, it implies an unusually steep
yield curve. This ﬁnding can help to explain the unusual weakness
of broad monetary aggregates since, as we have seen in the previ-
ous section, their dynamics are tightly linked to portfolio considera-
tions. Along this line, ECB (2010) provides a set of estimates of the
impact of yield-curve dynamics on the developments in broad mone-
tary aggregates and shows that the impact of the unusual steepness
of the yield curve on monetary aggregates is sizable,20 although it
cannot account for the full extent of the unusual reduction in broad
monetary aggregates.
Finally, in order to provide some indications of the mechanisms
explaining the weakness of some categories of loans, we match
the ﬁndings on quantities with results on the associated lending
rates.
Figure 8 shows that, consistent with the results on quantities, the
observed path of lending rates for short-term loans to non-ﬁnancial
corporations is in line with the counterfactual path. Instead, lending
rates on mortgages have been stickier, particularly in the 2008–09
period. This result suggests that the unusual weakness in certain
categories of loans seen above may have been due, at least partly,
to the restriction of supply by banks which has aﬀected riskier and
less proﬁtable categories such as long-term loans.21
20The growth rates of M3 would have been between 2 and 3 percent higher in
2010 had the steepness of the yield curve behaved in line with past regularities.
21Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro (2012) and De Santis and Darracq Paries
(2013), using data from the Bank Lending Survey, provide more evidence on the
relevance of supply factors to explain the tightness of euro-area credit markets.
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5. Conclusions
This paper provides stylized facts on the cyclical dynamics of a rich
set of variables, including real and nominal macroeconomic variables,
banks retail loans, deposits, interest rates at various maturities, and
key ﬁnancial and monetary indicators for the euro area. We then
identify breaks in historical regularities after the crisis on the basis
of a counterfactual experiment.
Our ﬁndings show that, pre-crisis, the dynamics of the series
considered correspond quite closely to what has been found for the
United States in a large body of empirical literature.
As for the post-crisis developments, our key result is the dissimi-
larity in the behavior of short-term interest rates, loans, and deposits
from their long-term counterparts. While the former variables dis-
play a stable relationship with the business cycle, the latter do not.
Long-term interest rates are higher than suggested from the pre-
crisis association with cyclical variables, while long-term loans and
deposits are lower. One implication of these ﬁndings is that while
systematic monetary policy in the euro area did not deviate from
the implicit pre-crisis rule, the transmission from short-term rates
to long rates was impaired.
The heterogeneity between the short and the long end of the
maturity structure of euro-area bank assets and liabilities, and cor-
responding interest rates, suggests some promising directions to
improve economic modeling. Such heterogeneity emerges both in
the analysis of the pre-crisis stylized facts and in the post-crisis
dynamics, revealing a market segmentation that is not just a fea-
ture of speciﬁc shocks or economic regimes. Despite the progress in
the modeling of macroﬁnancial linkages stimulated by the extended
period of ﬁnancial turmoil of the last decade, the characterization
of the banking sector has remained quite stylized, largely failing to
capture some of the relevant aspects of the segmentation highlighted
in this paper. For example, among other things, the portfolio eﬀects
that turn out to be important drivers of the long end of bank lia-
bilities play generally a small role, if any, in macroeconomic models
with banking.
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Appendix. Database
Table 1. Database
Variables Transformation Units
Industrial Production Log-Levels Ind.
HICP Log-Levels Ind.
Unemployment Rate Levels Ppt.
Producer Prices Index Log-Levels Ind.
U.S. Industrial Production Log-Levels Ind.
U.S. Consumer Prices Index Log-Levels Ind.
U.S. Federal Funds Rate Levels Ppt.
EURIBOR Three Months Levels Ppt.
Consumer Conﬁdence Levels Bal.
Oil Price (Euro) Log-Levels Ind.
U.S./Euro Exchange Rate Log-Levels $/€
Stock Prices Log-Levels Ind.
Two-Year Bond Rate Levels Ppt.
Five-Year Bond Rate Levels Ppt.
Ten-Year Bond Rate Levels Ppt.
M1 Log-Levels €Bl.
M2 Log-Levels €Bl.
M3 Log-Levels €Bl.
Loans to Non-ﬁnancial Corporations up
to One Year
Log-Levels €Bl.
Loans to Non-ﬁnancial Corporations
over One Year
Log-Levels €Bl.
Consumer Loans Log-Levels €Bl.
Loans for House Purchases Log-Levels €Bl.
Other Loans Log-Levels €Bl.
Lending Rate, Loans to NFC up to One
Year
Levels Ppt.
Lending Rate, Consumer Loans Levels Ppt.
Lending Rate, Loans for House
Purchases
Levels Ppt.
Saving Deposits Log-Levels €Bl.
Time Deposits Log-Levels €Bl.
Notes: HICP: Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices; NFC: Non-ﬁnancial corpora-
tions; Bl: billions; Ppt: percentage points; Ind: index number; Bal: balance of positive
and negative replies to surveys on economic conditions in the euro area. The data
on ﬁnancial intermediation (loans, deposits, and monetary aggregates) are deﬁned in
terms of notional stocks. For details, see Colangelo and Lenza (2013).
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